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ARTICLES
THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOL IN THE
TEACHING OF LEGAL ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
WARREN E. BURGER*
M Y THESIS IS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. Every law school has a
profound duty-and a unique opportunity-to inculcate principles
of professional ethics and standards in its students. This duty should
permeate the entire educational experience beginning with the first
hour of the first day in law school.
The failure to do this is, perhaps, even more serious than the failure
to relate legal theory to practice. I recognize the interest and creativity
which has gone into the development of some law school courses directly
devoted to professional responsibility and ethics in the past decade.
There has been, for example, progress in developing more adequate
teaching materials. There is a special value in confronting ethical issues
within the practical setting of clinical-type courses. But professional
standards and ethics can neither effectively be left to one or two
courses, nor should this crucial area be so relegated and denigrated as it
has been for so long.
While concern with ethical issues ought to permeate the entire educa-
tional process in law school, it is not solely the law schools' responsibi-
lity to instill members of the bar with the feeling of the responsibility
for what it is to be a member of the bar. To see that higher standards of
responsibility permeate the profession, all three branches-law schools,
bar and bench-must cooperate and build upon the foundations laid in
recent years.
I. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
To become a lawyer is to be more than being available as a "hired
gun" or a "legal mechanic." To be sure, one of our great tasks is to be
effective advocates. The history of our profession is rich with accounts
of lawyers who risked careers by asserting their independence in oppo-
*Chief Justice of the United States.
I acknowledge the painstaking work of Dr. Jeffrey Morris, who took on the
initial task of sifting through what I have written over more than two decades on
these problems. I also thank Dr. Mark Cannon, my Administrative Assistant, for
comments and suggestions from a non-lawyer point of view.
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sition to the government or to popular attitudes.' Andrew Hamilton did
that in defending John Peter Zenger; John Adams did that when he
defended the soldiers accused of what history calls the "Boston
Massacre;" that is what Luther Martin and others did when they
defended Aaron Burr in his trial for treason.2 Defending their clients,
these men advanced the liberties of all. An independent judiciary alone
is not enough; it must be supported by a strong, independent, coura-
geous and competent bar. This is an imperative for a free people.
But lawyers are not "licensed" to promote conflict; they must be more
than skilled legal technicians. We should be that, but in a larger sense,
we must be legal architects, engineers, builders, and from time to time,
inventors as well. We have served, and must continue to see our role, as
problem-solvers, harmonizers, and peacemakers, the healers-not the
promoters-of conflict. Lawyers must reconcile and stabilize, for a
democracy often functions best by compromise. For hundreds of years
England and the United States have been able largely to avoid interne-
cine conflict, vigilantism, and collective violence because lawyers have
served as the indispensable "brokers" of social progress,3 providing the
lubricant for acceptable resolution of controversies and for gradual
change and evolution of the law.' It bears repeating that we must see
ourselves more clearly in the function of healers rather than as pro-
moters of litigation.'
Our profession carries public and ethical burdens with its privileges.
Daniel Webster spoke of justice as "the greatest interest of man on
earth."6 As a profession with a monopoly over the performance of cer-
W.N. SEYMOUR, THE OBLIGATION OF THE LAWYER TO HIs PROFESSION 18
(1968).
2 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
' Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J. 121
(1968).
' This is not the occasion to treat at length the unhappy saga of betrayal of
public trust by lawyer-public officials in recent years. My predecessor, Charles
Evans Hughes, once said to a group of students at Yale:
Work in your chosen field to the best of your ability, enter into political
activities without thought or demand of reward, do your duty as a
citizen because it is your duty and not because you expect office, keep
yourself free from embarassing obligations, be ready to take office if it
comes your way and you can take it; but never let the thought of your
selection stay your efforts in aiding the community to better things.
C.E. HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 54-55 (1910).
1 George Sharswood, the seminal figure in American legal ethics, wrote: "A
very important part of the advocate's duty is to moderate the passions of the
party, and where the case is of a character to justify it, to encourage an amicable
compromise of the controversy." G. Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics
in 32 ABA REP. 109 (5th ed. 1907).
6 Wilkie, The Role of the Supreme Court in Regulating the Ethics of
Lawyers and Judges, 49 WIS. B. BULL. 23, 24 (Feb. 1976).
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tain services, we have special obligations to the consumers of justice to
be energetic and imaginative in producing the best quality of justice at
the lowest possible costs for those who use it, and with a minimum of
delay. It was in these respects that my late colleague, Charles Fahy,
hoped that we would think of a lawyer and the law as forces for moral
good, "as a civilization of its own, enhancing the whole of our civiliza-
tion."'
II. THE PUBLIC AND THE BAR
Unfortunately, few members of the general public see us this way. In
one poll lawyers ranked in ninth place among professions on a public
credibility rating, just above law enforcement officers, television news
reporters and plumbers.8 In 1974, a poll sponsored by the American Bar
Association showed: sixty-eight percent (68/a) of the public believed
that lawyers charged more for their services than they were worth;
sixty percent (6 00 /a) believed that lawyers work harder for wealthy,
influential clients than for others; eight-two percent (82/) believed that
many matters could be handled as well and cheaper by accountants,
bank officers, and insurance agents; and forty-two percent (42%)
believed that "lawyers are not concerned about doing anything about
the bad apples in the legal profession."9 A 1977 Gallup poll on the
honesty and ethical standards of lawyers found that only twenty-six per-
cent (26%) of the sample rated honesty and ethical standards of lawyers
as being high or very high, while twenty-seven percent (27%) rated
lawyers' honesty and ethical standards low or very low. These results
were substantially lower than those for members of the clergy, medical
doctors, engineers, college teachers, bankers, police, journalists, under-
takers, business executives, building contractors and others. Lawyers
did rank higher than members of Congress, realtors, labor union
leaders, state office holders, advertising practitioners and car
salesmen.'"
One can reasonably question the validity of such surveys, but the find-
ings of these polls-accurate or not-suggest that the public's percep-
tion of lawyers is that they needlessly complicate the problems of life;
that average citizens do not seek legal advice as often as they could or
should; that lawyers are not prompt in getting things done; and that
Cohn, Charles Fahy, 68 GEo. L.J. iii, v (Oct. 1979) (quoting Charles Fahy).
See McKay, Legal Education: Law, Lawyers, and Ethics, 23 DE PAUL L.
REv. 641, 644 (1974).
1 B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 231-34 (1977).
'0 G. GALLUP, Honesty and Ethical Standards in THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC
OPINION 1972-1977, 1196-97 (1978). See Gallup, Honesty and Ethical Standards of
Lawyers, 1978 THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX 17 (Jan. 1978) (Report No. 150). See
also S. ROPER, THE ROPER REPORTS, 1977, 123-25 (1977); S. ROPER, THE ROPER
REPORTS, 1978, 63-65 (1978).
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lawyers do not care whether their clients fully understand what needs
to be done and why. For my part, I would seriously question that these
public perceptions are accurate-or fair-but as "straws in the wind,"
they afford little basis for complacency. These results, to some degree,
are due to age-old, popular suspicions of the jargon and technicality in
the profession, and to a failure to understand that lawyers are specia-
lists who become identified with the interests they represent in con-
flicts. It is inevitable that lawyers, to some extent, become scapegoats.
Over the centuries artists like Daumier, Shakespeare, Samuel Johnson,
Dickens and Shaw, have had harsh things to say about the law's delays,
lawyers' avarice, and the role of lawyers in fomenting conflicts."
But, as Harlan Fiske Stone wrote almost a half-century ago:
We cannot brush aside this lay dissatisfaction with lawyers with
the comforting assurance that it is nothing more than the
chronic distrust of the lawyer class which the literature of every
age has portrayed. It is, I fear, the expression of a belief too
general and too firmly held for us the shut our eyes to it.'
2
Nor can we take comfort in the diagnosis that lawyers are not alone
among American institutions and professions-public and private-to
suffer declining respect. A significant part of our profession has been,
and continues to be, guilty of grave ethical lapses over which public
awareness and resentment have grown. More serious is the compla-
cency of the organized bar with even the most grave lapses of profes-
sional propriety.
III. COMMON ETHICAL PROBLEMS
Doubtless it is a small minority of American lawyers who are guilty of
unprofessional conduct, but they are far too many in number and they
still largely escape censure. The greatest number of client complaints
are about incompetence, neglect and procrastination. Whitney North
Seymour, Jr. has reported that eighty percent (80%) of the client com-
plaints to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York deal with
the lawyer's failure to perform his or her professional responsibilities
promptly, or at all. 3 A 1978 survey of members of the Virginia bar found
that Virginia lawyers believed that one out of every five lawyers fre-
quently failed to perform satisfactory work for his or her clients.'4 In a
" See, e.g., Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, Act IV, Scene ii, line 86: "The
first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
,2 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934)
'3 W.N. SEYMOUR, JR., WHY JUSTICE FAILS 17 (1973).
1 Washington Star, August 28, 1978. For a similar finding in the years
1928-1948, see A. BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 258 (1954)
(statistics for Illinois).
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recent year, client neglect was the most common complaint to the Board
of Professional Responsibility of the District of Columbia."
At various times, I have expressed profound concern about the inade-
quate courtroom performance of far too many American lawyers. It is
the disadvantaged members of society whose interests are most likely
to be prejudiced by such lack of competence.16 Although some observers
may have initially questioned the seriousness of the problem of the com-
petency of trial advocates, a series of studies have revealed an unmis-
takable picture of a growing recognition by all parts of the profession
that there is indeed "a serious problem."'7 As with the consumers of
medical services, it is the lawyer's clients who suffer the most serious
consequences. The quality of advocacy directly affects the rights of
litigants, the costs of litigation, the proper functioning of the justice
system, and ultimately, the quality of justice. In this area at least, we
are beginning to show some progress, although only the "tip of the
iceberg" has been addressed. 8
I have also expressed concern over the failure of many lawyers to
observe elementary standards of civility in professional manners,
behavior, and decorum. Certain rules of behavior, etiquette and man-
ners are the indispensable lubricant of our inherently contentious
system of adversary justice. They keep the focus of the courtroom con-
test on issues and facts and away from distracting personal clashes and
irrelevancies. Civility in a trial distinguishes a courtroom contest from a
barroom brawl. 9 There is nothing incompatible between zealous and
courageous advocancy and conformity to standards of ethics and profes-
sional behavior.
Another chronic concern is the cost of legal services. In 1978, it was
estimated that sixty percent (60%) or more of the population did not
"s Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1958. To be sure, data based upon complaints
must be scrutinized with care. Many complaints are crank complaints. Others
come from clients who have lost their case or who have not gotten along with
their lawyers.
16 Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Cer-
tification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV.
227 (1973).
17 See, e.g., A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1978); Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to
Law School Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264 (1978); Maddi, Trial Advocacy
Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 105 (1978); Law
Poll, Burger Not All That Wrong?, 64 A.B.A.J. 832 (1978).
18 See Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Problem of Delinquency of
Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980).
9 Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971) (remarks to the
American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1971). See Ehrlich, Charles H.
Miller Lecture-Lawyers and Their Public Responsibilities, 46 TENN. L. REV.
713, 718 (1979).
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have meaningful access to legal services." In spite of this, there are a
host of relatively simple transactions where ordinary folk must employ
lawyers because our profession has a monopoly. In all too many
cases-the purchase of a home being a good example-clients are "rip-
ped off" by fees that are greatly out of proportion to the complexity of
the transaction or the time spent by the lawyer. Perhaps nowhere else
are there more instances of the imposition of excessive fees, of charging
buyer and seller (or lender and borrower) for the same services or of
"jacking up" closing costs to an unreasonable and unwarranted level,
than in the sale of real property. This still occurs even though recent
Court decisions have held that the minimum fee schedules of bar associ-
ations for title searches constitute price-fixing in violation of the anti-
trust laws," and-wisely or not-have upheld lawyer advertising.2 Any
intelligent person can be trained to close real estate transactions at a
reasonable cost. That is precisely the kind of service a paralegal can per-
form.
Lawyers have become too costly for the middle class.y A corporate
attorney's statement suggests the dimension of the problem: "If you
earn $75,000 a year you couldn't afford my fees. Things have gotten so
bad I can't afford my own fees."24
To some extent, this is a problem that goes beyond the ethics of high
fees. It is time that the profession explored computerization for
maintenance of land title records and the process of examining land
titles to reduce costs to a fraction of the present figures. Ways must be
found to simplify and reduce the cost of transferring property at death.
It is time to explore new ways to deal with such family problems as
divorce, child custody and adoptions. 5 I have also suggested that "fully
trained litigation lawyers" may not be "needed to resolve some kinds of
" Hellman, Considering the Future of Legal Education: Law Schools and
Social Justice, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 170, 184 n.64 (1978). See B. CHRISTENSON,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970); B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1970); Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Ser-
vices, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339 (1975).
21 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
' Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
See McKay, Legal Education: Law, Lawyers, and Ethics, 23 DE PAUL L.
REV. 641 (1974). See also Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for
the Middle Class, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1963).
24 J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 55 (1978). See The Organized Bar: Self-
Serving or Serving the Public?, in HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
REPRESENTATION OF CITIZEN INTERESTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. -A Need for Systematic Anticipation in
THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 33-34 (A.
Levin & R. Wheeler 1979).
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conflicts, and, except for part of the decision-making process, they may
be a handicap.""0
[C]onsumer[s] with $300 in controversy for car repairs, or a
dispute on a defective roofing job, or a malfunctioning home
appliance, [prefer] a reasonably satisfactory resolution to the
protracted legal proceedings that are characteristic of courts. I
suggest that most people will prefer an effective, common sense
tribunal of non-lawyers, or a mix of two non-lawyers and one
lawyer, rather than the traditional court system to resolve
[their] modest but irritating claim[s]. 7
Some progress to these ends has been made in the past five years. 8
There are other problems which can be limited or ended only by
greater ethical sensitivity, i.e., lawyers who practice with conflicts of
interest, who breach fiduciary obligations, or who commit fraud. 9 Last
year a reporter, posing as an accident victim, went to thirteen personal
injury lawyers in New York City with a case in which their willingness
to aid and abet her in perjuring herself would have produced a large
contingency fee. In her hypothetical situation, an undetectable lie would
have turned a hopeless claim into a winner with a potential for a big
recovery. Several of the thirteen lawyers offered to set up the fraud."
We know that the public is conscious of dishonesty in many areas of
modern life, including the professions." We know too, that public
tolerance for these abuses increased during the 1970's when we began
to produce more law school graduates than ever before, more litigation
than ever before, and when legal fees increased more rapidly than the
rate of inflation. During the 1970's there were increased misuse and
abuse of pre-trial discovery and growing concern that the class action
had, in too many instances, evolved in an action more for the benefit of
the lawyers than for the benefit of the class.
IV. PROGRESS BY THE ORGANIZED BAR IN DEALING WITH
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The organized bar-especially the American Bar Association-has
been aware of the shortcomings and the extent of popular dissatisfac-
' Remarks by Warren E. Burger, Minor Disputes Resolution Conference, in
New York City (May 27, 1977) at 6.
Id. at 5.
See Warren E. Burger, End-of-the-Year Statement, 1980, at 6-8 (released
Dec. 29, 1980).
9 See, e.g., A. BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, supra note 14, at 258.
Berentson, Integrity Test in AMERICAN LAWYER 15-18 (May 1980).
3' Thomason, What the Public Thinks of Lawyers, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 151-57
(April 1974).
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tion with the administration of justice, but only each local bar can imple-
ment remedies. In little more than a decade there have been two major
efforts to define ethical standards for the profession, as well as revision
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, creation of Uniform Standards for bar
discipline which have been widely adopted in the states, proposed
Uniform Federal Disciplinary Rules, creation of standards for criminal
justice and creation of a National Disciplinary Data Bank.
In 1964, the American Bar Association created the Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards to examine the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics and to make recommendations for changes. In 1967, wide-
spread concern over the state of disciplinary procedures and their
enforcement led to creation of the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement. Retired Justice
Tom C. Clark was named chairman. The ABA Committee, concerned
that attorneys disbarred in one jurisdiction were practicing in others
and that there were no procedures for the exchange of information
about discipline between jurisdictions, recommended the creation of a
National Discipline Data Bank in an interim report. After favorable
replies from disciplinary agencies, the House of Delegates authorized
the establishment of the Discipline Data Bank, which was approved by
the Board of Governors on May 21, 1968.8
By 1970, the Canons were described as "little more than a collection
of pious homilies,"3 although they clearly established the duty of
lawyers to be ethical in their professional work. As early as 1934,
Harlan Fiske Stone had written that "[ojur Canons of ethics for the most
part are generalizations designed for an earlier era. 34 Deciding that
piecemeal amendment of the 1908 Canons would no longer suffice, the
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards submitted a new
code, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. It was adopted by
the ABA on Aug. 12, 1969. The Model Code had nine Canons, which
were general concepts or standards; 138 Ethical Considerations, which
were aspirational; and 41 Disciplinary Rules, which were mandatory
standards. Fifty states and the District of Columbia adopted at least the
Disciplinary Rules within a few years.
The Report of the Clark Committee may have had even greater
impact on upgrading ethical procedures than the newly restated ethical
standards. The Committee minced no words in its description of the
state of disciplinary machinery. On the very first page of the report was
this conclusion:
812 ABA SPEC. COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROB-
LEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 156 (June 1970)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK REPORT].
3 Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A.J. 639, 639 (1977).
1, Stone, supra note 12, at 10.
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[T]his committee must report the existence of a scandalous situ-
ation that requires the immediate attention of the profession.
With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward
disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostil-
ity. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many juris-
dictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many disci-
plinary agencies have little power to take effective steps against
malefactors."
The Committee dealt with thirty-six problems through recommenda-
tions regarding disciplinary structures and jurisdiction, the financing,
staffing and record-keeping of such agencies, their acceptance within
the profession, and the exchange of information between jurisdictions. 6
The Committee recommended the establishment of procedures by bar
associations for the arbitration of fee disputes, procedures for handling
claims against attorneys, and for client security funds." The Committee
also stressed the need to centralize bar discipline procedures and to
make them more professional.
The existence of the ABA Committee, the questionnaires it had sent
out to every disciplinary agency and its regional hearings stimulated
some jurisdictions to embark upon renewed efforts to achieve more
effective disciplinary enforcement, even before the final report of the
Committee was submitted."
Along with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
ABA Committee Report, there was a good deal of other activity in the
field of professional responsibility during the 1970's. The ABA adopted
a set of standards for prosecution and defense lawyers as part of its
monumental Criminal Justice Standards Project. An ABA Committee
was appointed 1969 to redraft the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. The
new Code, adopted by the ABA in 1972, helped to clarify standards for
judges and to maintain public trust in the judicial process. The Code
was promptly adopted by most state courts. The federal courts also
adopted it, adding several stringent provisions.
The ABA established the Center for Professional Responsibility (later
called the National Center for Professional Responsibility) in 1973. It is
the central clearinghouse for information on case law, rules, memoran-
da, and statistics in the field of professional responsibility. a9 The Stan-
s CLARK REPORT, supra note 32, at 1 (emphasis added).
In 1956 the ABA Special Committee on Disciplinary Processes had submit-
ted a report in the form of a uniform model code of rules of court for disciplinary
proceedings.
" CLARK REPORT, supra note 32, at 186.
" CLARK REPORT, supra note 32, at 192-93.
" See M. B. SHOAF, STATE DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS STRUC-
TURAL SURVEY (1980) (compiled for National Center for Professional Responsibi-
lity). See also Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60
A.B.A.J. 821, 822 (1974).
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ding Committee on Professional Responsibility, together with the
center for Professional Responsibility, developed the "Suggested
Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement"4 to help states revise
their disciplinary enforcement systems.
Most states adopted disciplinary procedures similar to those sug-
gested in the Clark Committee recommendations: Centralization of
disciplinary enforcement; rotation of membership on disciplinary boards;
initiation of investigation without complaints; centrally located records;
suspension for incapacity or on conviction of serious crime, and convic-
tion as conclusive evidence of guilt for purposes of a disciplinary pro-
ceeding.41 Between 1970 and 1975, many fee-arbitration systems were
established. In 1970, Michigan became the first state to add non-lawyer
members to disciplinary boards. Recently, Maryland became the
twenty-third state to do so.42
At the request of the Appellate Judges' Conference and the ABA
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, the Joint Committee on
Professional Discipline was appointed to develop standards for courts to
use in establishing a structure for judicial and lawyer disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Pro-
ceedings were approved by the House of Delegates in February, 1979."3
The ABA and the Judical Conference of the United States have
endorsed the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, which is
the result of cooperation between the Subcommittee on Judicial Improve-
ments of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration
and the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline. I have strongly
supported these rules.4 All but seven federal districts now participate
in the National Discipline Data Bank.
The last major effort of the 1970's in the area of discipline, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct-the work of the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards-have yet to be approved by the
House of Delegates and the states.45 Whatever is done to modify or
reframe standards of professional responsibility, the most vital concern
10 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1974).
" Letter from John C. MeNulty to Bryant Edwards, Table 3 (Nov. 15, 1976)
(on file in the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States).
" Bar Notes, More States Adding Public to Discipline Boards, NAT'L L.J.
June 25, 1979, at 7. See generally M. BAYS SHOAF, supra note 39.
" See generally ABA NAT'L CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE JT. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1979).
" See Letter from Warren E. Burger to John C. McNulty (Nov. 23, 1977). See
also Burger, The State of the Judiciary 1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358, 359 (1979).
(1979).
" See, e.g., Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
66 A.B.A.J. 47 (1980); Patterson, supra note 33.
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is to make them understood and to enforce them to show we intend
them as a means to protect the public.
The work of the organized bar for nearly two decades offers the hope
of restoring and maintaining an honorable and effective legal profession.
The record of the bar toward self-enforcement has surely improved, but
more must be done. We have learned that we can no longer tolerate
faltering enforcement programs which diverge widely among the fifty
states with the unhappy spectacle of the bar looking to the bench and
the bench to the bar for action. While making state procedures modern
and professional has led to an increase in discipline as well as voluntary
resignations, too often even criminal prosecutions against lawyers do
not result in significant disciplinary action.46
We still have a long way to go, and we could well take a leaf from the
British. In England, the education of lawyers, the framing of standards
of conduct, and the power to enforce such standards is in the hands of
the bar. At the core of their training is inculcation of strict standards of
civility and decorum, and high standards of ethical conduct. Those
aspects of training begin on the very first day of the educational process
and permeate the entire educational experience. Occasions for discipline
are relatively rare, for misconduct is dealt with swiftly and-by our
standards-harshly. There are relatively few disbarments in England,
"not because our chaps are more moral," as one London Bar leader put
it, "but because they know the consequences of a lapse." In any
multiple-judge American courthouse, numerous offenses occur daily
which would bring severe censure if committed by a British barrister.
They go largely unremarked over here. Yet, although rigidly regulated
and disciplined by their peers, British barristers remain vigorous,
zealous, courageous and independent. 7
Less money is still being spent nationally on professional discipline
than may accrue to lawyers in one big case.48 There must be adequate
staffing and financial resources. If we are to maintain public confidence
in our profession, it is imperative that courts and local and state bar
associations take positive action to deal with every manifestation of pro-
fessional misconduct. This must be don: fearlessly and with fairness to
the public, the profession, and the individuals involved. Every segment
of the organized bar must share the responsibility of seeing that the
public interest comes first. The ABA Committee chaired by Justice
Clark warned: "[U]nless public dissatisfaction with existing disciplinary
procedures is heeded and concrete action taken to remedy the defects,
the public soon will insist on taking matters into its own hands." 9
48 W.N. SEYMOUR, JR., supra note 13, at 18.
,7 It is, of course, fair to note that England has far fewer lawyers than we
do-and none of the complexities of our federal system.
" See More Discipline Money Needed, Expert Claims, 63 A.B.A.J. 312 (1977).
49 CLARK REPORT, supra note 32, at 2.
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V. LAW SCHOOLS AND THE TEACHING OF LEGAL ETHICS
Almost a half-century ago, Harlan Fiske Stone observed that the
character of the law schools determines the character of the legal pro-
fession.' Surely the failures of the law school in teaching legal ethics
and professional responsibility are responsible in some measure for the
ethical problems in our profession. We now have generations of lawyers
whose superior technical training has not been leavened by adequate
training in ethics and professional responsibility. Of course, there are
exceptions, but, on the whole, what the law schools have done is to take
young men and women and train them in the skills of a professional
monopoly, leaving the learning of moral and ethical precepts-which
ought to guide the exercise of such an important monopoly-to a vague,
undetermined, unregulated, and undefined future. Paradoxically, the
guild, which emphasized rigorous thought and analytical discipline,
somehow assumes that ethical standards will be absorbed during prac-
tice by osmosis."
Some observers argue that character and moral sense are largely
molded by the time students get to law school."2 There is some truth to
this. The law school cannot replace the family, the church or synagogue,
or the strong role model provided by the classroom teacher during the
years of elementary and secondary school." But we know full well that
the law school is an immensely powerful force in defining, structuring,
and internalizing professional norms, values and attitudes." Studies
have established that over the course of law school study, student inter-
est and involvement in classwork drops off radically.15 Unfortunately,
there are also studies suggesting a progressive decline on the part of
students in sensitivity and concern about the ethical ideas of profes-
sionalism, from their pre-law days through law school and into
I Stone, supra note 12, at 14.
51 See Warren E. Burger, The Role of the Lawyer in Modern Society,
Remarks at Convocation of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law, Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah (Sept. 5, 1975).
52 See generally Hellman, supra note 20, at 171 n.11.
Generally, ethics are inadequately taught in much of higher education,
although medical schools have made progress in recent years. Note the words of
John C. Sawhill:
As long as educators cater only to the transient interests of society and
the job market, we run the risk of reaching the moon without knowing
why, of curing illness in the lab when there is still suffering in the field....
In charting our course to a successful future, we must have the data of
the science of ethics.
Sawhill, A Question of Ethics, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1979, at 27.
Hellman, supra note 20, at 171.
See Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 652-59
(1973). See also Boyer and Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for
Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 276, 277 n.197 (1974).
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practice." Many law students come to law school because they view
lawyers as dedicated to ideas of service, high ethical standards and
problem-solving. 7 If their sensitivity to ethical problems as well as their
idealism declines, the law schools are doing a markedly poor job of what
former Dean Robert B. McKay calls "the one thing which we should be
charged with above all others, the inculcation of a sense of discipline
and morality into the practice of the law." 8
Many acute observers have remarked on this failing of legal educa-
tion. For example, in 1963, a survey of 134 law schools produced the
results that forty percent of the 123 deans surveyed (or their delegates)
did not consider their law school's approach to teaching legal ethics and
professional responsibility satisfactory. 9 Tom Clark wrote in 1968:
"[Tjhere is a strong consensus among the disciplinary agencies ... that
law schools have failed thus far to institute courses which effectively
promote pride in the profession and elevate ethical standards."6
And again in 1975: "We have been meeting and talking about [profes-
sional responsibility] for over fifty years, but the truth is that we have
done little to correct the ethical emptiness in our law schools.""1
Chesterfield Smith, as President of the ABA, wrote in 1974: "I go to
all kinds of law schools . . . and very few of them are proud of their
course in legal ethics. Most of them are kind of ashamed of it."6 "
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. has concurred in these evaluations,
stating: "[Liaw schools training on such subjects as ethics and profes-
sional responsibility is also woefully inadequate."63
I have not argued that law schools can necessarily make up for the
shortcomings in an individual's previous ethical training,64 nor do I
argue that law schools should or could do so much that no further expo-
' Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Respon-
sibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 14-15 (1963).
57 Stevens, supra note 55, at 612-14.
' McKay, supra note 8, at 645.
59 L. LANBORN, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A SURVEY
OF CURRENT METHODS OF INSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 15 (1963).
o Clark, More Effective Disciplinary Enforcement-A Beginning, 40 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 407, 409 (1968).
61 Clark, Teaching Professonal Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 260 (1975).
12 The Bar and Watergate: A Conversation with Chesterfield Smith, 1
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 31 (1974).
63 W.N. SEYMOUR, JR., supra note 13, at 11. See also Boyer and Cramton,
supra note 55, at 286.
" Dr. Charles Malik, former President of the United Nations General
Assembly, speaking to a Conference on education, stated: "I search in vain for
any reference to the fact that character, personal integrity, spiritual depth, the
highest moral standards, the wonderful living values of the great tradition, have
anything to do with the business of the university or the world of learning." See
Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association, 67 A.B.A.J. 290, 291
(1981).
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sure to ethical issues is necessary. 5 But I do submit that a very large
responsibility rests with the law school to teach real life problems in
real life terms. The law school is uniquely situated to shape and form
the habits of students during the period in which their professional
ideals and standards of ethics, decorum and conduct are being formed.
At this stage, law students are more malleable and receptive than they
will be after years of professional observation of bad habits of legal
thinking, legal application, or dubious ethics.
Some law teachers do not believe that their function and the function
of their schools is to teach these fundamentals of professional respon-
sibility any more than to train trial advocates. Too many remark, "[wie
are teaching students to think-we are not running a trade school." But
lawyers who know how to think in legal terms, but have not learned
how to behave, are a menace to society and a liability, not an asset, to
the administration of justice." Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote in 1934:
From the beginning the law schools have steadily raised their
intellectual standards. It is not too much to say that they have
worshipped the proficiency which they have sought and attained
to a remarkable degree. But there is grave danger to the public
if this proficiency is directed wholly to private ends without
thought of the social consequences, and we may well pause to
consider whether the professional school has done well to
neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the
social responsibility which rests upon a public profession ...
[T]hat conception is a distorted one if it envisages only the
cultivation of skill without thought of how and to what end it is
to be used, and the question of what the law schools have done
and can do to make that conception truer is one to be pondered...."
VI. How LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY MIGHT BE TAUGHT
The increased attention during the past few years by some law
teachers and some law schools to the teaching of legal ethics and profes-
sional responsibility is encouraging. There have been national con-
65 See COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(CLEPR), THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT, 1973-74 (1974). I agree with the conclusions of
the 1977 National Conference on the Teaching of Professional Responsibility that
those working in the area of continuing legal education ought to include in their
specialty courses materials to maintain the sensitivity of the bar to issues of pro-
fessional ethics. See TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MATERIALS AND
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE xv. (A. Keenan ed. 1979) [herein-
after cited as 1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. See also Wilkie, supra note 6, at 24.
N See Burger, supra note 19, at 215.
67 Stone, supra note 12, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
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ferences on the subject, 8 seminars at the Association of American Law
Schools' annual meeting, articles about the proper methods for teaching
legal ethics and attempts at creative and innovative programs in several
law schools.
The American Bar Association amended its standards for accredita-
tion in 1974 to mandate that the law schools shall: ". . . provide and
require for all student candidates for a professional degree, instruction
in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession." 9 The ABA
standard requires that the "history, goals, structure and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members, including the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, are all covered.""0 While not limiting instruc-
tion to a specific pedagogical method, the standard encourages the law
school to "involve members of the bench and bar in such instruction. 7'
Practitioners know these problems first hand.
The most popular approach to the teaching of legal ethics, according
to a 1977 survey by the Association of American Law Schools, is a
required course, sometimes entitled "legal ethics," or sometimes "pro-
fessional responsibility." According to that survey, one-third of
American law schools make this course worth but one credit. This does
not begin to allow enough time to cover the subject matter. Moreover, it
carries with it the connotation that the law school places little value on
professional responsibility. The subject ought to rate with Constitu-
tional Law-at a minimum. In one-sixth of these courses, grading is
pass/fail (while other courses are graded traditionally), possibly another
sign of institutional disinterest-if not an abdication of responsibility.
This course is most often available towards the end of law school, when
students are the least motivated and the most cynical. According to the
1977 survey, the instructors for this course were not practitioners, but
legal educators, often full professors, who averaged two years exper-
ience in teaching the course 2 -a dull chore to be shed as soon as pos-
" See, e.g., 1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65; The Society of
American Law Teachers National Conference on the Future of Legal Education,
at NYU Law School (Dec. 1976), proceedings discussed in 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
293-675 (1978). There were also National Conferences at Boulder in 1956 and
1968. See J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY: A REPORT
AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS FOR THEIR
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES, 1956 (1959); Weckstein, EDUCATION IN PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (D. Weckstein ed. 1970) (proceedings of the
National Conference on Education in the Professional Responsibilities of the
Lawyer, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, June 10-13, 1968).
so ABA, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS-ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE § 302(a) (iii) (1979).
70 Id.
71 Id.
" While this subject matter ought ideally to be addressed by an instructor
with extensive experience in practice, this is at least an improvement over the
past where faculty members avoided this course like the plague. See Frankel,
Can a Good Lawyer Be a Good Person? NAT'L L.J. Nov. 27, 1978, at 19.
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sible! The most encouraging aspect of the survey is that most law schools
have not moved away from the sterile method of lecturing at their
students about professional responsibility. Today, more and more law
schools use the "problem" or casebook methods and new casebooks and
other materials have proliferated. 3
Some law schools, like the Spessard Holland Law Center of the Uni-
versity of Florida, 4 have approached their single course in professional
responsibility with great imagination. But too many of the courses
offered are examples of tokenism. As then Professor Donald Weckstein
said in 1968: "We cannot expect too much from ethics classes held, like
church services, a couple of hours a week.'"" Too many courses are given
in too few hours and taught by too many faculty members who lack both
dedication and practical experience. A token course on ethics might be
worse than none, creating an illusion pregnant with mischief.
Advocates of clinical education argue that it is the best vehicle for
teaching professional responsibility"8 because students need firsthand
observation of the ways in which ethical problems arise and of the ac-
tual mores of the bar. This was clearly one of the principal aims in the
efforts of the Counsel on Legal Education for Professional Responsibili-
ty which claimed that:
Only in the clinic, where the teacher, and the student are per-
sonally involved, where they have to take action and face the
consequences; where they undergo tensions which upset their
emotions and take away their peace of mind, is there opportun-
ity to develop the moral fiber and the proper instincts for deal-
ing with ethical problems in a professionally responsible way.
Thus the principal reliance for teaching ethics and professional
responsibility must be on the law school clinic and on clinical
legal education."
Learning about ethics comes easier, no doubt, when professor and stu-
dent are jointly facing moral dilemmas than when they are standing out-
side a problem and commenting on it. 8
But the clinic is not yet ready to become the primary method for
" Goldberg, 1977 National Survey on Current Methods of Teaching Profes-
sional Responsibility in American Law Schools, in 1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 65, at 21-57.
" See Maloney, Panel on Methods of Teaching Professional Responsibility, in
1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 67-68. See also Levinson,
Teaching Professional Responsibility at Vanderbilt University School of Law, in
1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 117-24.
" Weckstein, Boulder II: Why and How, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 304, 308 (1969).
78 Weinstein, Educating Ethical Lawyers, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 260 (1975).
" COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THIRD
BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 65, at 9.
78 Id.
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teaching ethics. The law schools have not yet provided enough clinical
courses for those students interested in taking them. There is no form
of quality control at present to insure that instructors in the clinics will
be especially sensitive to issues of professional ethics, or whether they
too may fall prey to overzealous advocacy for clients. 9 Furthermore, it
is an error to segregate ethics to any one course or any one part of the
curriculum.
A variety of other methods are used in law schools to expose students
to ethical issues. The first-year introductory course in legal methods
may devote a percentage of its time to ethical issues. Occasionally,
discussions are held even before the standard first-year courses begin.
Some law schools encourage extracurricular dinner meetings led by
judges and lawyers paralleling those at the four Inns of Court in Lon-
don. Sometimes the student bar association of a law school will conduct
discussions or show films. Some law schools send out reading lists to
entering first-year students upon admission or even upon application to
the law school."
I repeat that from the first hour of the first day in law school there
must be emphasis on the ethical principles and standards of conduct
governing the profession. Ethics cannot be taught in a single course or
clinic. I suspect that in most cases,.legal ethics will not be taught effec-
tively if the lead instructor has not had extensive experience in prac-
tice. Legal ethics should not be taught as a catechism by rote memoriza-
tion or by lecturing at students. Students will learn through clinics and
through discussion with faculty members, members of the bar and
judges. Students will learn professional responsibility if sensitized to
the ethical issues as they arise in various courses in substantive and
procedural law."
79 See LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND ETHICS (M. T. Bloom ed. 1974) (interesting
commentaries upon the ethical problems coming to the attention of the clinical
professor).
' Harris Wofford has suggested that law school faculties should add ethicists,
moral philosophers and social scientists. See Hellman, supra note 20, at 181.
81 Although I use the word "pervade," I distinguish my approach from the so-
called "pervasive" method of teaching professional responsibility which typically
involves several members of the faculty taking special care to point out and
discuss in their regular courses various latent issues in professional responsibi-
lity. To judge by the 1977 National Conference on Teaching Responsibility, the
pervasive method is out of favor because of lack of time, specific knowledge of
ethical problems, and possibly also due to the attitudes of professors. Still
another, more encouraging-reason is the growth in the number of professors
who are scholars in this field "defending their turf." See generally the Discus-
sions at the 1968 Boulder Conference where this method was highly recom-
mended. See Covington, The Pervasive Approach on Teaching Professional
Responsibility: Experiences in an Insurance Course, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 365
(1969). See also Goldberg, 1977 National Survey on Current Methods of Teaching
Professional Responsibility in American Law Schools, in 1977 NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE, supra note 65, at 23-24; Weckstein, Panel on Methods of Teaching Pro-
fessional Responsibility, in 1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 63-66.
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The accreditation requirement of a course in professional responsibi-
lity is an imperative. To put it bluntly, a law school that sweeps this
problem under the rug should not be accredited. The growth of scholar-
ship and teaching materials in this field is a welcome development and
the subject should not be cast to one side of the curriculum. As Paul
Von Blum wrote: "Ethics courses and the like are valuable beginnings;
at every level of legal education, however, personal morality should be
stressed as much as technical precision."82
There is not a single area of law where one can practice as a true pro-
fessional without knowledge of ethical precepts. If some professors are
more interested in and more sensitive to ethical considerations than
others, then all the more reason for each professor to feel responsible
for detecting and raising ethical issues peculiar to his or her subject
matter with students. The argument that there is no time to consider
ethical questions in a course, due to the need to teach substantive law, is
a confession of misplaced priorities.
Indeed, what I am proposing is that faculties, as corporate entities,
give h far higher priority to the teaching of ethics, for at present neither
faculties nor bar examiners, nor the profession as a whole, make sen-
sitivity to ethical considerations a high priority. What are students to
think when they see professional responsibility as a one-credit, pass/fail
course largely irrelevant to the bar examination and the job market?
What are they to think when professors cannot find time in courses in
contracts or torts for ethical questions? We cannot expect a dramatic
recasting of bar examinations and employment criteria (although some
thought might be given to both areas), but we can at least expect law
school faculties to resolve to make professional responsibility a higher
learning priority. 3 Finally, even as the teaching of ethics in law schools
comes to pervade the curriculum, it is important that students are
exposed, while they are in school, to experienced practitioners who are
facing ethical dilemmas."
VII. CONCLUSION
Possibly, some law professors will say, "What business is this of
yours?" Professor (now Judge) Jerre S. Williams, in his Presidential
Address to the Association of American Law Schools, recognized that
I Von Blum, A New Course of Professional Responsibility: "The Legal Pro-
fession in the Humanities," 30 J. LEGAL EDUc. 366, 369 (1979).
' When ethical considerations, in the broadest sense, are regarded as signifi-
cant as such staples as contracts, torts, and property, there will be a reasonable
chance for qualitative change. See Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional
Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 247, 255 (1979).
" See Joiner, Professional Responsibility: A View from the Bench, in 1977
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 3, 7, 18.
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law schools are not an end unto themselves, but a tool: "Faculties must
recognize that law schools are created to serve the legal profession and
ultimately the society in which we live."85 Soon after the ABA fixed its
modest requirements for teaching professional responsibility in its stan-
dards of accreditation, Dean McKay wrote: "A few years ago I am not
sure we would have welcomed that requirement. We might have
thought it inappropriate or too difficult, preferring not to be told what
to do. Now I believe we welcome the requirement because we recognize
how badly we have done.""5
The operation of a law school is a high trust, not a private enterprise
for the benefit of its faculty. And, as with every fiduciary function, it
must be treated as a stewardship for which there is an account-
ability-accountability to the public, to the concept of the rule of law,
and to the principles of justice." To meet this high trust, law schools
must have the support of local and state bar associations and from the
Judiciary.
85 Jerre S. Williams, Legal Education in the Age of Accountability, Presiden-
tial Address to the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 3, 1980).
88 McKay, supra note 8, at 644.
87 See Burger, The Role of the Lawyer in Modern Society, supra note 51, at 8.
19801
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss3/12
